

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 27 1967

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On file OMB release instructions apply.

Honorable Richard Helms  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dick:

My staff has reviewed the six Program Memoranda and seven special studies which CIA has forwarded to the Bureau. The quality of the Program Memoranda has improved over CY 1966. The major areas for further improvement are in the presentation of the alternatives and the reasons for the recommendations, based on the analytical effort of your staff. A brief narrative indicating what alternatives were considered with respect to major issues, and why a specific alternative was chosen would greatly increase the value of the PMs. I expect that our staffs will jointly work to overcome this deficiency prior to submission of the CY 1968 Program Memoranda.

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During the coming year I believe that we should also continue to improve our analysis of the total national intelligence resource allocation. The first Target Oriented Display of intelligence resources should provide some meaningful insight into the distribution of these assets by target. In addition, we should continue to assess the utility of alternative and complementary streams of intelligence information on some of the more important intelligence targets. An element in such an assessment is the extent to which our national decisions would be affected by the intelligence information being sought. I am aware that your National Intelligence Program Evaluation staff is involved in studies of this kind.

The need for such an analysis is especially pressing in the area of Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems. We are already directing large amounts of intelligence resources to the ABM problem and substantial increases are being proposed. I would like to request that a special study effort be undertaken to identify that ABM information most needed in the foreseeable future for U.S. decisions on the design and deployment of U.S. forces and other matters of major importance. Enclosed is a copy of terms of reference for the analysis which I believe is needed.

The work of the USIB Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) has been especially helpful in this connection and the additional effort that I am proposing could be based in part on the Committee's work.

Due to the imminent nature of decisions on major collection systems targeted specifically on the Soviet ABM problem and the necessity to face some of these decisions in connection with the FY 1969 Budget, it would be most useful if this analysis could be completed in the next month to six weeks.


Specific Bureau questions relating to or generated by the Program Memoranda and studies have been given to Agency staff during recent joint sessions. Further questions will undoubtedly arise after Bureau review of the outstanding special studies. We will forward these to your staff expeditiously.

Enclosed are some general questions which should be addressed within the next several months.

Sincerely,

*Charles L. Schultze*

Charles L. Schultze  
Director



Enclosures

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Program-Wide

1. Tour Length and Training Special Studies - We look forward to receiving these and discussing them with your staff.
2. Communications Support - We share your concern over spiraling electrical traffic volume and would like further information on the steps that you have indicated are being taken to reduce the rate of increase. In particular, we would like to review the monthly two-way all-media communications flow for representative stations within a 48-hour mail radius of Headquarters.

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Information Processing and Exploitation

1. ADP - The Bureau is very interested in learning the CIA views on the advantages/disadvantages of placing the various Washington-area computer capabilities under a "single manager." As an example, recent advances in computer technology (such as controlled access to privacy files) would seem to reduce, if not eliminate the need for a separate ADP function [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

2. Signal Processing/Analysis - Bureau staff will be reviewing the needs for the substantial increase requested for processing and analysis of signal data and, in particular, the requirements for "new and different analysis" of data from systems [REDACTED]

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ABM Study

Terms of Reference

The major objective of this study will be to analyze the time urgency of requirements for intelligence on Soviet ABM activities by identifying the cost to our own strategic programs of near term uncertainty about various aspects of Soviet ABM. In other words, the study will attempt to establish the usefulness of a particular kind of intelligence in terms of improving the ability of the user to make specific decisions now in prospect. At least four kinds of decisions will be considered:

1. Force planning - The development and procurement of U.S. strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces are affected both by what we know and don't know about Soviet ABM, and by what we believe we will or won't know at some point in the future.
2. Force operations - Different kinds of Soviet ABM will require different weapons targeting, penetration tactics, withholding doctrine, defensive commitments, and command and control functions.
3. Politics and diplomacy - Decision-making in this area both leads and lags military affairs and a political leader may need additional information or the same information with greater reliability.
4. Intelligence - The intelligence community has its own unique needs for information on Soviet ABM either as a corollary indicator of other current activities or as an investment for the future.

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Obviously then, the study must consider both the current and future time frames including estimate of when we might know certain things.

More specifically, the study should first establish the utility of information on different characteristics of Soviet ABM's. We need to know what information is vital and what information is almost irrelevant. These needs should be expressed by user, by time period, and by allowable uncertainty.

Next, the study should devise a model whereby ABM intelligence needs can be satisfied from observables, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Finally, the study should evaluate the performance, cost, and schedules for current and planned collection and processing in terms of (1) their ability to satisfy the more important ABM needs and (2) their relative ability to satisfy other intelligence needs related to specific decisions about strategic forces.

This study should include full-time participation by representatives of the Department of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. These representatives should be authorized to task agencies within their department.